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Introduction and summary
In 2007, the American bald eagle, a symbol of our na-
tion, was removed from the threatened species list. But 
another American icon (or two) might well take its 
place on the list. On December 14, 2006, the United 
States Mint announced new regulations “to limit the 
exportation, melting, or treatment” of the American 
penny and nickel coins. The purpose of these regula-
tions is “to safeguard against a potential shortage of 
these coins in circulation.” The regulations make it  
illegal to export, melt, or treat one-cent and five-cent 
coins of the United States, except in some cases or 
with the Secretary of the Treasury’s explicit permission.1
Our pennies and nickels, it turns out, are threat-
ened with extinction by melting. Why that is the case, 
and what can be done about it, is the subject of this 
article. As inflation erodes the value of money, a coin 
of a given denomination (say, one cent or five cents) 
loses value. But coins are made of a physical material 
whose intrinsic value is usually low relative to the 
value of the coin, yet not negligible. Every now and 
then, we reach a point where the market value of the 
coin (its purchasing power) drops close to or below 
the intrinsic value of the materials used to make it. 
Our pennies and nickels have now reached that point. 
This has two consequences. One is that the Mint 
is producing these coins at a loss. It now costs 1.67 cents 
to make a penny and 5.97 cents to make a nickel. The 
other is that it can be profitable to melt down the coins 
and recycle their metal content. The Mint’s regulations 
were announced because we are close to the melt-down 
point for pennies and nickels.
The problem we are now facing is infrequent but, 
in many ways, a very old one. Seven hundred years 
ago (in the statute of 1299), the Parliament of England 
enacted that “no good money of silver, of the king’s 
coin or other, nor any silver in plate or otherwise, 
should go forth or be carried out of the Realm or out 
of the King’s power into foreign parts without espe-
cial leave from the king” (Ruding, 1817–19, Vol. 1,  
p. 385). This was the first of many such prohibitions—
sometimes under penalty of death. 
These prohibitions were passed at a time when 
money was different from ours, that is, when it was  
made of precious metals like gold and silver. Our money 
does not derive its value from its intrinsic content, 
which should be immaterial. In this article, I will first 
explain how a medieval problem can reappear in modern 
times. I will provide a quick overview of the history 
of American coinage, highlighting earlier instances of 
such problems, in particular the coin shortages of 1964 
and 1965, and what solutions were adopted then. I will 
then discuss possible remedies to our current situation. 
Historical background
The economy needs money to operate. Money is 
commonly described as having two functions: a unit 
of account in which prices and obligations are denomi-
nated and a medium of exchange in actual transactions. 
The two functions are logically distinct, but typically 
the unit of account has been tied to an actual medium 
of exchange. Coined money—that is, standardized 
quantities of metal shaped into a convenient form for 
everyday use—was introduced in Europe in the sixth 
century BC, and has served as a medium of exchange 
for almost all of subsequent history; and the unit of 
account has consequently been tied to the metal or 
metals coined. 
In medieval Europe, where our modern system 
has its roots,2 the metal was silver; the coin was the 
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convenience. Governments set the standards by de-
ciding how much metal went into a penny. The quan-
tity of money was determined by the private sector, in 
the following way. If more money was needed, metal 
was brought to the mint and transformed into new coins, 
usually for a fee called seigniorage. If less money was 
needed, money was melted down and the metal turned 
to other uses. The signal for minting or melting was 
given by the price level (the inverse of the value of 
money): If silver in the form of coins was too cheap, 
it was profitable to turn it into bullion; if it was too 
expensive, it was profitable to sell bullion to the mint 
and acquire new coins. These two actions (and the 
equivalent actions of importing and exporting coins) 
served to regulate the price level.
The system worked well with one coin. But the 
growing needs of trade led to the introduction of larg-
er silver coins and later even more valuable gold coins; 
and with multiple coins, the system does not work as 
well. The reason is that smaller coins are more expen-
sive to make, in proportion to value, than larger ones. 
Mints were not subsidized and had to recover their 
production costs. This created a wider gap between 
minting and melting points for small coins than for 
large coins: The value of small coins had to go up higher 
before minting new ones became profitable (net of 
production costs). This led to a dilemma. If the mint 
bought silver for the same nominal price whether it 
paid in large or small coins, small coins had to con-
tain less silver relative to their value and large coins 
might disappear and be melted down for their con-
tent. If the mint made all coins full-bodied, but charged 
more for small coins, large coins would be produced 
but not small coins, even when they were needed. 
The Middle Ages were plagued with difficulties 
in maintaining an adequate supply of all denomina-
tions (Sargent and Velde, 2002). One common response 
to a shortage of one denomination was to prohibit the 
melting or exporting of the coins in short supply. The 
English statute of 1299 was an early example. It was 
followed within a few years by many other such stat-
utes—a clear indication that such measures were dif-
ficult to enforce and had limited effect. 
Another short-term solution was to debase the 
coin in short supply. Debasing a coin meant reducing 
its intrinsic content—for example, putting less silver 
in each penny. For a given market value of silver, de-
basement of one denomination can make it profitable 
to mint it again. In the case of medieval England, the 
cycle of melting prohibitions begun in 1299 led to a 
debasement of silver money in 1343. A debasement 
would restore the supply of the scarce denomination 
for a while, but inevitably shortages reappeared and 
further debasements followed. This repeated process 
led over time to pennies containing less silver and 
more copper, so much so that by the late eighteenth 
century, British (and American) pennies were made 
of pure copper. 
A long-term solution was to return to the single-
coin system, preserving the traditional minting and 
melting mechanism for one large gold coin and mak-
ing the other coins token—that is, worth substantially 
more as money than as metal. The large coin pegged 
the value of the unit of account to a particular com-
modity, as in any commodity money system. Smaller 
denominations, however, were fiduciary; that is, their 
value in circulation was significantly higher than that 
of their intrinsic content. Their value came not from 
their content, but from a policy of convertibility: The 
authorities stood ready to exchange subsidiary coin-
age for gold coins, and vice versa. The provision of 
token coins was then left to the government, which 
bought and sold token coins on demand and made a 
profit from the substantial difference between face 
value and content. This is called the gold standard, 
and it became the norm, after much experimentation, 
in most countries by the end of the nineteenth century.
The U.S. monetary system, which Congress has 
sole power to regulate, began in 1792 as a bimetallic 
system.3 This is a system in which silver and gold 
coins are provided by the minting and melting mecha-
nism, and both coins play the same role as anchor of 
the monetary system. The founding fathers did not in-
novate at all in monetary matters. The bimetallic system 
was commonplace in Europe (though not in the mother 
country of Great Britain). The very mixed record of 
paper money during the colonial era, as well as the 
decidedly disastrous experience of the Continental 
money issued to finance the American Revolution, 
had predisposed the U.S. government to adhere to a 
commodity money system throughout the denomina-
tion structure. Even the smallest coins, the cent and 
half cent, were made of copper but were not token, 
which led to various problems. Copper was not that 
valuable and a cent’s worth of copper was inconveniently 
large. Also, the world price of copper was volatile 
(because of its military uses), and it was difficult to 
maintain the cent at a fixed parity of 100:1 with the 
silver dollar. A similar problem arose from fluctua-
tions in the relative price of gold to silver, which led 
to periods when no gold coin or no silver coin was 
minted and which prompted one debasement in 1834. 
Prompted by the same forces as other countries, 
the U.S. gradually moved to a gold standard by mak-
ing the smaller coins token. The first step was in 
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was reduced relative to the silver content of the dollar 
coin. This proved difficult to enact, as there was reluc-
tance on the part of many legislators to issue token 
money. Then, in 1873, silver dollars ceased to be mint-
ed on demand. The market value of silver fell substantial-
ly so that silver dollars became tokens too. The U.S. 
formally adopted the gold standard in 1900. Smaller 
coins were made of silver (the quarter and dime), nick-
el and copper (the nickel), or a copper alloy (the pen-
ny). The value of the silver in a quarter was around 
10 cents. A quarter was worth 25 cents because the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury was always willing 
to exchange 40 of those coins for a gold $10 coin.
When the Federal Reserve System was created in 
1914, the U.S. remained on a gold standard because 
Federal Reserve notes were redeemable on demand 
into gold at a fixed parity of $20.67 per ounce. The 
Great Depression, as well as the perceived need to in-
crease the money supply without constraints to stimu-
late the economy, led to drastic changes. The gold 
content of the dollar was reduced by 40 percent, pri-
vate holdings of gold by U.S. citizens were prohibited, 
and the Federal Reserve notes ceased to be redeem-
able on demand. The U.S. was on its way to a fiat 
money system (one in which money has value by fiat, 
that is, because the monetary authority or the govern-
ment decrees it). After World War II, the Bretton Woods 
system restored a semblance of the gold standard, 
with foreign currencies convertible into dollars and 
dollars convertible into gold for foreigners. This last-
ed until 1971, when President Nixon closed the gold 
window and permanently severed the tie between the 
dollar and any commodity.
What about smaller denominations? In 1934, the 
Silver Purchase Act was passed, requiring the Treasury 
to purchase silver with the goal of reaching either a 
market price equal to its “monetary price” of $1.29 or 
a certain proportion of the monetary stock. The reasons 
for this action were complex: The issue of silver cer-
tificates in exchange for the silver purchased was to 
provide an additional avenue for increasing the money 
supply. Also, strong pressures from western states where 
silver was mined played a role in the legislation. 
The market price of silver in late 1933 was 44 cents 
an ounce, and during the following years, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury bought silver at above-
market prices, between 50 cents and 77.5 cents an 
ounce, and after 1946 at 90.5 cents an ounce, accumu-
lating a stockpile of 3,200 million ounces. By 1955, 
however, the world price of silver had risen to the 
Treasury’s purchase price, and the Treasury began 
selling its silver, as it was authorized to do under  
existing legislation. Prices remained pegged at the 
Treasury’s price of 90.5 cents an ounce, and the 
stockpile of silver that was not held to back silver 
certificates dwindled until November 1961, when 
President Kennedy stopped the sales. The price of  
silver started rising, and it reached the monetary  
price in September 1963. 
At that price, the metallic content of dimes, quar-
ters, half dollars, and dollars was exactly equal to their 
face value. Anyone needing silver for industrial uses 
could readily buy it on the commodities market as 
bullion or buy it from the banking system in the form 
of coins and melt them down.4 As world supply and 
demand factors kept exerting upward pressure on prices, 
the U.S. monetary stockpile was drawn down, in vari-
ous ways, either by redemption of silver certificates 
or else by the United States Mint working overtime  
to meet the “demand” for quarters and dimes. In early 
1963, Treasury officials estimated that their silver 
supply would last 20 years. But the demand for sub-
sidiary coinage proved unexpectedly strong, and the 
Mint’s annual production quadrupled from 1963 to 
1964. This was attributed initially to the growing use 
of vending machines, but it became clear that much 
of this demand was speculative: The public was buy-
ing the Treasury’s stockpile at $1.29 an ounce in ex-
pectation of exhausting it and seeing the market price 
rise above the value they had paid. The Senate held 
hearings on the question in April and August of 1964 
but came to no conclusion. The Treasury conducted 
its own studies and recommended in February 1965 
that the silver content of subsidiary coinage be reduced 
or eliminated. In the end, following the recommendation 
of the Treasury studies, President Johnson proposed 
to Congress new legislation in June: It was swiftly 
voted into law and signed as the Coinage Act of 1965.5
The new law provided for the minting of the quar-
ters and dimes made of copper and nickel (or cupro-
nickel) that we know. The half dollar was replaced 
with a 40 percent silver core clad in copper and nickel.6  
The new quarters were issued in November 1965, by 
which time the reports of coin shortages had disap-
peared; dimes and half dollars followed in March 1966.
At the signing ceremony on July 23, 1965,  
President Johnson made curious remarks: “Some 
have asked whether our silver coins will disappear. 
The answer is very definitely no. … If anybody has 
any idea of hoarding our silver coins, let me say this. 
Treasury has a lot of silver on hand, and it can be, 
and it will be used to keep the price of silver in line 
with its value in our present silver coin. There will be 
no profit in holding them out of circulation for the 
value of their silver content.”720 1Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
Indeed, the government’s intention was not to re-
place silver dimes and quarters with cupronickel 
dimes and quarters, but only to reduce global demand 
for silver by removing the United States Mint from 
the ranks of the buyers. But keeping the existing stock 
of silver dimes and quarters in circulation was possi-
ble only if the price of silver did not rise above $1.29 
an ounce. To achieve this, the Treasury had two means. 
One was its large stockpile of silver. The other was 
the authority given by the Coinage Act of 1965 to pro-
hibit the melting and exportation of coins when nec-
essary. The Treasury used both means in succession. 
First, for two years it sold silver at $1.29 an ounce, the 
price at which a quarter’s content was worth 25 cents. 
The silver stockpile went from 1,200 million ounces 
in 1964 to 350 million in 1967. Then, using its new 
powers under the Coinage Act of 1965, it banned the 
melting, treatment, and export of silver dimes and quar-
ters on May 20, 1967. Soon after, the Treasury stopped 
supplying silver at a fixed price on July 14, 1967, the 
day on which silver became “just another metal.” 
The prohibition met with some negative reactions 
in Congress, where two representatives introduced 
bills to repeal it, without success.8 Although the ban 
was enforced and resulted in several indictments,9 it 
did not prevent the disappearance of silver quarters 
and dimes from circulation. Silver half dollars had 
virtually disappeared from circulation by early 1966, 
and there were already reports of “culling” by con-
sumers, that is, people picking out silver coins from 
their change and paying out only clad quarters.10 By 
June 1968, the Treasury was itself melting silver quar-
ters in its vaults, using new electronic sorting machines.11 
In August 1968, it was reported that dealers were 
paying 12 percent above face value for silver quarters 
and dimes. The combined forces of the Treasury and 
private speculators rapidly removed the silver coin-
age from circulation, making the ban moot. It was 
lifted in June 1969.
The provisions of the Coinage Act of 1965 were 
used a second time—this time to protect the penny. 
The peg to gold had ended in August 1971. Inflation 
was rampant, and commodity prices were exploding. 
On April 1, 1974, the price of copper reached a record 
of $1.40 per pound. At the time, 154 pennies contained 
one pound of copper. Although copper prices fell back 
somewhat, the demand for pennies rose to suspicious-
ly high levels. The Treasury concluded that hoarding 
was under way in expectation that it would become 
profitable to melt pennies, and it announced the ban 
on April 18, 1974. 
A few months later, Public Law 93-441 (31 USC 
5112(c)) granted to the Secretary of the Treasury the 
power to change the proportion of zinc and copper in 
pennies to ensure adequate supplies. This gave the 
Treasury the option to replace copper with zinc in the 
composition of the penny, at its discretion. Copper 
prices stayed below the penny’s melting point in sub-
sequent years, so the ban was lifted in June 1978 with-
out any further action. Soon, however, copper prices 
rose again and hit another record of $1.44 per pound  
on February 12, 1980. The Treasury briefly considered 
another ban, but instead used its statutory authority to 
change the composition of the penny, almost revers-
ing the proportions. The Mint announced in June 
1981 that, instead of 95 percent copper and 5 percent 
tin and zinc, pennies would be primarily zinc with a 
coating of copper; production started early the fol-
lowing year. As in 1965, no effort was made to retire 
the older coins: They were allowed to remain in cir-
culation side by side with the new pennies.
Most people do not know that all pennies are not 
the same. Lincoln’s profile has been unchanged since 
1909. But take a penny dated 1983 or later and scratch 
its surface; you will see the shiny white zinc under-
neath the copper coating. As for the nickel, its size 
and composition have not changed since 1866. The 
effort to maintain the outward appearance of the coin-
age suggests the importance of habits in our attitudes 
toward coinage and currency.
The current situation 
Between 1982 and 2004, the price of copper 
surged to the level of $1.50 per pound a few times, 
briefly. But in late 2004 it reached that level once 
more and has not come down since. Other commodi-
ties have surged in value as well, notably zinc and 
nickel. Table 1 shows the current value of the metal 
contained in U.S. coins.
The values shown in table 1 do not properly mea-
sure the profit to be made by melting down the coins. 
It would be necessary to subtract melting and refining 
costs (scrap copper is worth about 20 percent less than 
high-grade copper whose price is used in table 1). 
Collecting and shipping the coins for melting would 
impose additional costs, and those costs would be rel-
atively larger for the smaller denominations, since 
digging a penny or a nickel out of a sofa requires the 
same effort. 
Nevertheless, in 2006 some businesses became 
interested in the activity and inquired with the Mint 
about the legality of melting down coins. One firm in a 
midwestern state even began buying pennies from banks 
and sorting them to extract pre-1982 copper pennies. 
When the regulations were issued in December 2006, 
the Treasury had good reason to think that melting 
pennies and nickels was close to being profitable.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago















The nature of the problem
This brief historical overview frames the prob-
lem, which is something of a paradox.
A fiat money system is one in which money has 
value by fiat, that is, because someone said “let it be 
so.” Economists like to describe money in their mod-
els as “intrinsically useless pieces of colored paper” 
because the challenge for monetary economics is to 
explain the value of such objects. For objects that are 
not intrinsically useless, we have standard price theo-
ry. For claims on objects that are not intrinsically use-
less, we have finance theory. 
Since at least 1971, the U.S. has operated under a 
pure fiat money system, in which the intrinsic value 
of the objects used as a medium of exchange should 
not matter. This is in stark contrast with the commod-
ity money regime of 1900. In that regime, the intrin-
sic content of coins provided a floor below which the 
value of coins could not fall, and minting on demand 
provided a ceiling above which it could not rise. The 
gap between floor and ceiling was usually fairly 
small. Under a fiat money regime, the ceiling is re-
moved, as there is no minting on demand. The floor is 
normally of no consideration because no one pays 
much attention to the content of coins (copper pen-
nies and zinc pennies circulate at par, although the 
content of the former is twice as valuable as the con-
tent of the latter). The stock of money, and its value, 
is determined not by minting and melting, but by the 
monetary authority’s policy. In this respect there is no 
difference between notes and coins. The value of a 
dollar bill has nothing to do with its alternative uses 
as wallpaper or insulating material. Pennies and nick-
els are like notes, except they are made of something 
more durable than paper.
Now that all our currency is fiduciary (that is, 
with a market value higher than the intrinsic value), 
the market value of the tokens we use in phys-
ical transactions should be of no consequence 
to their value. The problem of small change 
was a difficult one to solve under a commodi-
ty money regime, but in a fiat money regime 
shortages of small change should not occur. 
The value of pennies and nickels has reached 
the floor set by their intrinsic content. We are 
printing our money on needlessly expensive 
material. 
The historical overview also shows that 
this problem is not new. Figure 1 shows the 
value, as a percentage of face value, of the in-
trinsic content of coins minted every year 
since 1825 for three denominations. For all 
three types of coins (the penny, nickel, and 
quarter), there is over time a general upward 
trend; every time the value comes close to 100 per-
cent, it becomes necessary to change the composi-
tion, which has the effect of abruptly lowering the 
value of the intrinsic content. The quarter began at 
100 percent because it was a full-bodied coin, but in 
1853 it became a subsidiary coin, overvalued relative 
to its silver content.12 Figure 1 clearly shows what 
happened in 1965, when its composition was changed 
from silver to cupronickel. The line for the nickel  
displays a sharp uptick during World War II. At that 
time, nickel being needed for the war effort, nickels 
were made of silver. These coins swiftly disappeared 
in the early 1960s when the price of silver began to 
rise. Finally, the penny’s line falls sharply in 1982 
with the switch from copper to zinc.
The authority that the Secretary of the Treasury is 
using today to prohibit the melting and exportation of 
pennies and nickels was granted during the shortage 
of quarters and dimes in 1964–65. This authority was 
used to protect pennies in 1974. In each instance 
when the intrinsic value of the coin exceeded its face 
value, the long-term solution was to change the com-
position of the threatened coin. 
Logic suggests, and history shows, that prohibi-
tions on melting will not solve the problem. If it is re-
ally profitable to melt pennies or nickels, people will 
do it. The ban imposed in 1967 was lifted in 1969 be-
cause the coins it was designed to protect had disap-
peared. Such stopgap measures at best increase the costs 
of melting by a small amount—the probability of be-
ing caught times the penalties imposed. Devoting enough 
law enforcement resources to increase the probability 
of catching penny smelters hardly seems worthwhile. 
Alternatively, speculators can simply hoard the coins 
and incur time and storage costs as they wait for the 
regulations to be repealed. Those costs are real, but 22 1Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
they are modest compared with potential movements 
in commodity prices.
What drives this long-term trend in the intrinsic 
content of coins? Inflation is the answer. Although it 
was not much of a force in the nineteenth century (the 
price level was about the same in 1913 as in 1825), in 
the twentieth century it has been the main culprit. Money 
steadily loses its value relative to other goods, includ-
ing the goods with which it is made. In other words, 
the floor on the value of coins is always creeping up, 
however slowly. In countries with high levels of in-
flation, the process can be rapid, and coins become 
obsolete in a matter of a few years. Our relatively low 
inflation in the U.S. means that these problems occur 
relatively infrequently, but they do occur. 
The upward trend can be accelerated if metals 
rise in price faster than other goods. Figure 2 plots 
the real price of several metals that have been used in 
coins, deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The evi-
dence is rather mixed. For some metals, such as alu-
minum, the secular trend is clearly downward. For 
other metals, there are long cycles—for example, the 
rise in the 1970s and the fall in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Since 2000, however, all metals have shown a sharp 
increase. The recent surge in commodity prices may 
arguably be speculative, and prices could well come 
down again, lowering the floor for a while. But as 
long as inflation is positive, the real value of a penny 
(which is always $0.01 in nominal terms) will fall 
relative to goods and services. When zinc replaced 
copper in the manufacture of pennies in 1982, the re-
spite gained was relatively brief, since zinc was only 
half as costly as copper. Since zinc pennies were in-
troduced, the real value of the penny (as measured by 
inflation) has fallen by half. Even if commodity pric-
es stabilize, a 2 percent annual inflation rate will re-
duce the real value of the penny by another one-third 
over the next 20 years, and the problem will inevita-
bly return unless another metal is found to replace 
those used in pennies and nickels. 
Replacing the metal is not easy. As the law cur-
rently stands, the United States Mint has no authority 
to change the composition of the nickel and can only 
use copper and zinc for pennies. The Mint is never-
theless investigating alternatives. Finding a cheap 
metal is not enough: It must be easy to mint and must 
not present health risks, be allergenic, or wear out too 
quickly in circulation. Other countries, such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and those of the eurozone, have 
found steel a convenient substitute for other metals  
in the one-cent coin. Steel was used for the U.S.  
penny during World War II and was considered as  
an alternative in the 1970s. It has the advantage of 
being cheaper than other metals that have been used 
historically, such as aluminum (which was also con-
sidered in the 1970s), tin, and lead. New Zealand’s 
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U.S. coin production costs and profits, 2004
TaBlE 2
	 	 Costs	
Coin	 Metal	 Other	 Total	 Profits
	 (	-	-	-	-	percent	of	face	value	-	-	-	-	)	 ($millions)
Penny		 27		 66	 93	 2
Nickel	 56	 35	 91	 6
Dime	 9	 22	 31	 170
Quarter	 9	 20	 29	 424
Half	dollar		 9	 25	 34	 2






coinage now consists solely of steel cores, plated for 
aesthetic reasons with other metals and produced by 
the Royal Canadian Mint.
Even if a suitable metal is found, however, it will 
be difficult to produce pennies without taking a loss 
because production costs other than the metal were 
already 66 percent of face value in 2004 (see table 2). 
The Royal Canadian Mint is able to produce its pen-
ny for 0.8 cents.13 
Should we eliminate the penny?
A simpler alternative is to let the penny 
melt out of existence. After all, do we need 
the penny?
The penny’s role in our economy is not as 
a medium of exchange. There is nothing that a 
penny buys: Dime stores have long ago been 
replaced by dollar stores. Almost no coin-op-
erated machinery accepts it.14 We don’t even 
use it truly to make change. It is merely a 
symbolic counter to simulate remainders of a 
division by five in retail transactions. When I 
buy a cup of coffee and the price comes out to 
$1.98, I give two dollar bills, the cashier takes 
two pennies from the saucer next to the register and 
hands them to me, and I return them to the saucer. 
The transaction is the same as if the cashier rounded to 
$2.00, except for a little side game between me and 
the cashier involving copper-colored tokens.
That I and the cashier are willing to give away 
the pennies in the saucer suggests that the penny isn’t 
worth much. One way to see this is to measure the 
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penny with the value of time. Median weekly earn-
ings for wage earners and salaried workers are $675. 
Assuming a 40-hour workweek, it takes most U.S. 
workers no more than two seconds to earn a penny. 
Rounding transaction prices to the nearest five cents 
would save more than the time we spend fishing for 
pennies in our pockets or wallets.
A comparison with other countries is instructive. 
Figure 3 compares the values of the smallest circulat-
ing coins in about 30 countries—mostly the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) countries plus other European countries. The 
values of each coin are again measured in the time it 
takes to earn it at the average wage in manufacturing. 
The values are plotted as a function of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, measured in Geary-Khamis 
dollars (Maddison, 1995). There seems to be a small 
negative relationship. However, this relation is not 
very robust and is largely due to the recent adoption 
of the euro as the common currency by the relatively 
rich European countries (the same figure in 1999, 
right before the introduction of the euro, shows no 
significant relationship between the value of small 
coins and GDP per capita). 
What figure 3 does show is that there is a 
wide range across countries in terms of the 
value of their smallest denomination. That is 
in part because, in recent years, a number of 
countries have abandoned their smallest de-
nominations. In Australia and New Zealand, 
whose dollars are comparable in value to the 
U.S. dollar, one-cent coins were also made es-
sentially of copper. In 1987, the rise of copper 
prices made the one-cent coin unprofitable to 
mint. Instead of changing the content, New 
Zealand stopped producing its one-cent and 
two-cent coins (worth about 0.5 cents and one 
cent in U.S. currency, respectively) in March 
1989, and they ceased to be legal tender in 
April 1990. The coins were bought back by 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and melted 
down for scrap metal.15 Australia followed 
suit, stopping production of the coins in  
August 1990 and issuance in February 1992.16 
New Zealand went further in 2006: Existing 
five-cent, ten-cent, 20-cent, and 50-cent coins 
ceased to be legal tender, and all but the five-
cent denomination were replaced with smaller 
and cheaper coins of plated steel. 
In the eurozone, the smallest euro denom-
inations are the one-cent (currently worth 
about 1.5 cents in U.S. currency) and two-cent 
coins. Each country can mint its own coins (with a com-
mon European obverse and nationally designed reverse), 
and all coins are legal tender throughout the eurozone. 
Two countries, the Netherlands and Finland, opted 
not to issue one-cent and two-cent coins at all, and 
they officially encourage rounding to the nearest five 
cents within their borders. Outside of the eurozone, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia have recently elimi-
nated their two smallest coins, and Hungary plans to 
do so next year.
The penny is disappearing of its own accord in 
economic terms. Various interest groups (for exam-
ple, zinc producers, charities, and the state of Illinois) 
can point to continued support for the penny shown 
in polls.17 But the United States Mint’s annual output 
of pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters as a ratio of 
GDP tells a different story (see figure 4). While the 
relative importance of 25-cent coin output has been 
stable over the past 30 years, that of the other coins 
has been declining steadily. Relative to GDP, the out-
put of pennies is 12 percent of what it was in 1982. 
The trend is not much better for the nickel.
So a penny isn’t worth much and the quantities 
produced are declining relative to GDP, but we still 
FIguRE 3





































� � � �
�
�







2025 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
produce a lot of them. Since 1982, the Mint has pro-
duced 910 pennies for every man, woman, and child 
in America. It estimates that 100 billion pennies cur-
rently circulate. In 2006, the Mint used 20,000 tons  
of zinc, worth $60 million, to produce pennies. Even 
if the Mint (and the taxpayer) were not losing money 
on this activity, it would be fair to ask whether all that 
zinc might be put to better use than manufacturing 
throwaway tokens.
The declining value of the penny is not a tempo-
rary phenomenon. It is a trend driven by several fac-
tors. One, noted previously, is inflation. The penny 
has been part of our denomination structure since the 
beginning, in 1792, but the price level has gone up by 
a factor of 20 in the past century: A penny today is 
worth one-twentieth of a penny before World War I.  
If people got by without coins as small as 0.05 cents 
back then, we can probably do so today. A second 
factor is that, even in the absence of inflation, a penny 
means less over time because we are becoming rich-
er. As productivity grows, a penny will be worth ever 
less of our time because our time is more productive. 
A third factor is the replacement of cash (coins and 
notes) by other means of payment, notably electronic 
ones. Just as there was a boom in the demand for 
coins in the 1950s and 1960s because of the spread of 
coin-operated machinery, we can expect technologi-
cal change to affect the demand for coins in the future. 
These factors together tell us that the penny will 
disappear sooner or later, as did the farthing (one-
quarter of a penny) and the ha’penny (one-half of a 
penny) of medieval England, and our own half cent, 
last minted in 1857.
Moreover, the experience of other countries sug-
gests that there are few problems involved in doing so. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has not found any 
evidence of inflation or upward rounding since it with-
drew its one-cent and two-cent coins. The Royal  
Canadian Mint recently published survey results indicat-
ing that small retailers were vastly in favor of remov-
ing the penny, and consumers were split on the issue. 
Current legislative proposals
As I noted earlier, the solution to our problem of 
small change is constitutionally vested in the hands  
of Congress, and some legislation is on the agenda.
Two bills were introduced in Congress in early 
August 2007.18 Both bills confer on the Secretary of 
the Treasury the power to “prescribe the weight and 
the composition” of existing denominations, consid-
ering “such factors that the Secretary considers, in the 
Secretary’s sole discretion, to be appropriate.” A third 
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bill introduced in October 2007 includes a similar 
provision.19
Delegating such power to the Secretary of the 
Treasury would represent a significant change. Ever 
since the Coinage Act of 1792,20 Congress has retained 
for itself the exercise of its constitutional powers to 
“coin money, regulate the value thereof.” There were 
good reasons for the founding fathers to assign such 
powers to Congress. Under a commodity money system 
(the only system they could conceive for our country), 
setting the weight and composition of coins is the es-
sence of monetary policy and is therefore an extremely 
important power. Recent European history, with which 
they were familiar, gave them reason to be wary of 
handing over monetary policy to the executive branch. 
But things have changed. The composition of 
coins is not central to monetary policy anymore. Under 
a fiat system, it is a purely technical issue, whose 
only potential consequence for the legislature is the 
profit or loss made on coining. 
Profit on coinage, of course, is not negligible.  
Table 2 (p. 23) shows that, on some coins, the profits 
can be substantial. The high figure for the quarter re-
flects the success of the “state quarters” program, which 
has generated $3.2 billion in “above-average” profits 
on this denomination over eight years.
But profits can rapidly turn into losses. The United 
States Mint made a small profit ($5 million) on pennies 
and nickels in fiscal year 2005, but this turned into a 
loss of $33 million in fiscal year 2006 and a loss of 
almost $100 million in fiscal year 2007.
Congress therefore retains an interest in the issue 
of coin composition, but it could nevertheless delegate 
the details to the executive branch (namely, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury) because the issue is purely 
technical and because action in the executive branch 
will be timelier than passing new legislation each time.21
a medieval solution to a medieval problem
In a recent Chicago Fed Letter, I made a different 
proposal.22 Starting from the observation that there 
are many pennies in circulation but they are not really 
needed as one-cent coins and inspired by medieval 
debasements, I proposed that the prohibition on melt-
ing should be repealed and that pennies should hence-
forth be worth five cents. 
In this proposal, the existing nickels would dis-
appear and be melted down, which seems likely to be 
their fate under any conceivable proposal. Pennies 
would then be recycled as five-cent coins, avoiding 
the need to design and produce a new coin (a lengthy 
process). Since the Mint has produced about seven 
times as many pennies as nickels in the last 20 years, 
there should be enough pennies to serve as five-cent 
coins for a while.
The new value would be easily established by the 
monetary authority standing ready to exchange 20 
pennies for a dollar bill, instead of 100 pennies pres-
ently. It is true that vending machines and other coin-
operated equipment currently accepting nickels would 
have to be modified to accept pennies as five cents. 
But such modifications may be unavoidable if the 
nickel in its current form is doomed.
I call this a medieval solution because medieval 
debasements were sometimes carried out in this manner. 
When a coin was threatened by melting, as is now the 
case with our penny, there were two ways to debase 
it: One was to mint it with less metal than before, and 
the other was to increase its face value. Thus, in 1269 
Venice increased the face value of its grosso coin from 
26 to 28, and again in 1282 to 32, each time leaving 
its composition unchanged. As I recently found out, 
the idea also has precedent in U.S. history. During the 
1965 silver coinage crisis, Congressman Craig Hosmer 
(a Republican from California) proposed to “arbitrari-
ly double the value of existing silver coins” in order 
to save them from being melted down.23
The proposal would require everyone to ignore 
the inscription on the penny that says “one cent.” But 
there is also precedent for U.S. coins being worth 
more than what is written on them. In 1834, when the 
gold–silver ratio was adjusted, half eagles minted be-
fore that date and bearing the inscription “5 D” (five 
dollars) were declared to be “receivable in all payments 
at the rate of 94 and 8/10ths of a cent per pennyweight,” 
which works out to $5.33 for a full-weight coin.24 This 
was nothing else than a debasement, albeit a relative-
ly modest one.
Would such a measure be inflationary? The esti-
mated stock of pennies is 100 billion, so increasing 
their value to five cents would add $4 billion to the 
money supply, which represents 0.5 percent of the 
monetary base or 0.3 percent of M1 (a monetary ag-
gregate composed of currency and demand deposits). 
This is a modest addition. The average monthly in-
crease in the monetary base over the past three years 
has been about $2 billion; the monthly standard devi-
ation of M1 is about $6 billion over the same period. 
Thus, an addition of $4 billion would fall well within 
the range of typical monthly variations in the money 
supply. The one-time increase would also be offset by 
reduced issues of other coins and thus unlikely to 
have a noticeable impact.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Conclusion
To prevent a shortage of small change, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury recently enacted regula-
tions to prohibit melting and exportation of pennies 
and other coins. The threat of shortage arises because 
pennies and nickels are made of inappropriately ex-
pensive material, and there is or soon will be a profit 
to be made from transferring their content to alterna-
tive uses. 
There is $1 billion worth of resources sitting in 
cash registers, jars, and sofas across the United States. 
It makes little sense to keep replenishing them, and 
the regulations hold little promise of forestalling the 
inevitable very long. The traditional solution since 
medieval times is to “debase” the threatened coin, that 
is, make it of a cheaper material or assign it a higher 
face value, either of which requires congressional ac-
tion. But the current situation may well prompt a more 
general debate on whether such small denominations 
are worth saving—a debate that is ongoing in many 
other industrialized countries.
NOTES
1The regulations became permanent on April 16, 2007, and now 
constitute 31 CFR Part 82 (Federal Register, April 16, 2007). By 
law (31 USC 5111 (d1)), the Secretary of the Treasury “may pro-
hibit or limit the exportation, melting, or treatment of United States 
coins when the Secretary decides the prohibition or limitation is 
necessary to protect the coinage of the United States.” One of the 
exceptions to the regulations allows Federal Reserve Banks and 
depository institutions to continue exporting coins for circulation 
in “dollarized” countries, such as Ecuador and Panama.
2The word “penny” itself goes back at least to the ninth century.
3See Carothers (1930).
4This neglects refining costs: Coins consisted of silver at 90 percent 
purity mixed with copper.
5The Coinage Act of 1965 is also known as Public Law 89-81 (79 
Stat. 254).
6The silver core was abandoned in 1971; at the same time the 
Eisenhower dollar, also made of copper and nickel, was introduced 
to replace the silver dollar discontinued in 1964.
7Times Mirror Company (1965).
8Cabeen (1967).
9Three Manhattan jewelry technicians were arrested in December 
1967. Three men were arrested near Tucson, AZ, with two tons of 
dimes and quarters and a small smelter in April 1968; two men 
were arrested in Brooklyn and arraigned in December 1968 
(Laurence 1968; Dow Jones and Company, 1968a, b). 
10Janssen (1966). 
11Times Mirror Company (1968).
12The break in the quarter series in figure 1 is related to another 
shortage of small change—this one prompted by the introduction 
of fiat money in the form of “greenbacks,” notes that were not re-
deemable into gold or silver. During the subsequent period of infla-
tion, from 1861 through 1870, the dollar price of silver made it 
unprofitable to mint silver quarters, while existing quarters were 
hoarded or melted.
13Branswell (2007).
14One notable exception is the acceptance of pennies in automatic 
toll lanes on Illinois roads. Until a few years ago parking meters in 
downtown Hilo, HI, accepted pennies, but parking is now free.
15APN News and Media (1990).
16Glover (1992).
17Hagenbaugh (2006).
18HR 3330 and S 1986.
19HR 3956.
201 Statutes at Large 246.
21The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is vested with the power to 
“determine the denominations, form, design, content, weight, and 
composition of its bank notes and coins,” according to the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Act 1989, s. 25(2). Thus, the recent decision 
to abolish the five-cent denomination was taken by the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, without any legislation.
22Velde (2007).
23Foley (1965).
244 Statutes at Large 699, section 3.28 1Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
REFERENCES
APN News and Media, 1990, “Small coins worth 
$3m are sold as scrap,” New Zealand Herald,  
April 26, p. 9.
Branswell, Jack, 2007, “Is penny lane a dead end?,” 
Montreal Gazette, October 9, p. B1.
Cabeen, Richard McP., 1967, “Rules on handling 
silver coins may be due for a change,” Chicago  
Tribune, August 27, p. F8.
Carothers, Neil, 1930, Fractional Money: A History 
of the Small Coins and Fractional Paper Currency of 
the United States, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael 
R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and 
Gavin Wright (eds.), 2006, Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Millennium ed., 5 vols., New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Dow Jones and Company, 1968a, “Two men are 
seized, charged with illegal melting of coins,” Wall 
Street Journal, December 5, p. 29.
Dow Jones and Company, 1968b, “Three men 
charged with melting coins to reclaim silver,” Wall 
Street Journal, April 30, p. 9.
Foley, Thomas J., 1965, “Silverless and lighter coins 
asked by Johnson,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, p. 1.
Glover, Richard, 1992, “To coin a phrase, coppers 
are a rum deal now,” Sydney Morning Herald,  
January 30, p. 3.
Hagenbaugh, Barbara, 2006, “A penny saved could 
become a penny spurned,” USA Today, July 7, p. B1. 
Janssen, Richard F., 1966, “Gresham’s law faced by 
Mint,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, p. 1.
Laurence, Michael, 1968, “Better than money.  
Better than money?,” New York Times, August 25,  
p. SM4.
Maddison, Angus, 1995, Monitoring the World 
Economy, 1820–1992, Paris: Development Center  
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
Ruding, Rogers, 1817–19, Annals of the Coinage of 
Great Britain and its Dependencies, 3 vols., London: 
Nichols, Son, and Bentley. 
Sargent, Thomas J., and François R. Velde, 2002, 
The Big Problem of Small Change, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Times Mirror Company, 1968, “Silver quarters go 
to meet their melter,” Los Angeles Times, June 27,  
p. E24.
Times Mirror Company, 1965, “New ‘sandwich’ 
coins bill signed by Johnson,” Los Angeles Times, 
July 24, p. 3.
Velde, François, 2007, “What’s a penny (or a nickel) 
really worth?,” Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, No. 235a, February.